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Abstract—How does ﬁrm entry affect innovation incentives in incumbent
ﬁrms? Microdata suggest that there is heterogeneity across industries.
Speciﬁcally, incumbent productivity growth and patenting is positively
correlated with lagged greenﬁeld foreign ﬁrm entry in technologically
advanced industries, but not in laggard industries. In this paper we provide
evidence that these correlations arise from a causal effect predicted by
Schumpeterian growth theory—the threat of technologically advanced
entry spurs innovation incentives in sectors close to the technology
frontier, where successful innovation allows incumbents to survive the
threat, but discourages innovation in laggard sectors, where the threat
reduces incumbents’ expected rents from innovating. We ﬁnd that the
empirical patterns hold using rich micro panel data for the United
Kingdom. We control for the endogeneity of entry by exploiting major
European and U.K. policy reforms, and allow for endogeneity of addi-
tional factors. We complement the analysis for foreign entry with evidence
for domestic entry and entry through imports.
I. Introduction
T
HERE is a long-standing interest in the effects of entry,
which are widely recognized as major drivers of eco-
nomic growth. Entry can induce reallocation of inputs and
outputs, trigger knowledge spillovers, and affect innovation
incentives in incumbent ﬁrms. The desire to induce entry by
foreign ﬁrms has spurred widespread policy reforms, par-
ticularly in countries or industries behind the technology
frontier. However, empirical studies of the effects of market
liberalizations and inward direct investment from foreign
ﬁrms provide mixed results on incumbent reactions.1 In this
paper we explore systematic variation in the response of
incumbent ﬁrms to entry.
We are motivated by the following empirical regularity—we
see substantial heterogeneity in the correlation between green-
ﬁeld foreign ﬁrm entry and incumbent productivity growth
when we look across industries in the United Kingdom. In
industries close to the technology frontier there is a strong and
positive correlation, while a weak or even negative one is
found in industries that lag behind. This is illustrated in ﬁgure
1, where we plot the annual rate of greenﬁeld foreign ﬁrm
entry in each industry-year against the respective average of
subsequent total factor productivity growth in incumbent es-
tablishments. The sample is split at the median distance to the
technology frontier, as measured by a labor productivity index
that relates incumbents in U.K. industries to their U.S. industry
equivalent.
Our explanation for this variation follows from Schum-
peterian growth theory—threat from frontier entrants in-
duces incumbents in sectors that are initially close to the
technology frontier to innovate more, and this triggers
productivity growth, but entry threat reduces the expected
rents from doing R&D for incumbents in sectors further
from the frontier. In the former case, incumbent ﬁrms close
to the frontier know that they can escape and survive entry
by innovating successfully, and so they react with more
intensive innovation activities aimed at escaping the threat.
In the latter case, incumbents further behind the frontier
have no hope to win against an entrant. The escape-entry
effect in advanced industries is similar to the escape-
competition effect developed in Aghion et al. (2001). The
discouragement effect in lagging industries is similar to the
Schumpeterian appropriability effect of product market
competition. Systematic variation of innovation activity
with distance to the technology frontier was introduced into
Schumpeterian theory by Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005)
and, more closely related to this paper, by Acemoglu,
Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006).
Building on this theoretical background, we provide an
empirical analysis of the variation of incumbent reaction to
entry with distance to the technology frontier. We investi-
gate how incumbent (labor and total factor) productivity
growth and patenting reacts to entry and ﬁnd results that
mirror the theoretical predictions. The main identiﬁcation
problem that we address arises because entry threat is not
observable and it is endogenous to incumbent performance.
We use actual foreign ﬁrm entry as a proxy for the unob-
servable entry threat, which, if anything, exacerbates the
endogeneity problem (see discussion in section IIB). To
tackle this we exploit variation in U.K. entry conditions that
arises from a major policy reform in the European Union,
the Single Market Program, and from a series of U.K.
product market reforms in combination with rich micro
panel data. We provide two interesting insights. First, we
ﬁnd a consistent pattern of variation in incumbents’ reac-
tions to foreign ﬁrm entry using either U.K. policy reforms
or EU-wide policy reforms—a ﬁnding that may reduce
political-economy concerns about using country-speciﬁc
policy instruments in our context. Second, while our main
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© 2009 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technologymodel speciﬁcations include distance to frontier and control
variables such as import penetration and proﬁtability that
are assumed exogenous, we ﬁnd similar effects of entry
when we allow for endogeneity of these variables. These
ﬁndings relate our work to the literature on competition and
trade. We complement our main analysis by considering
whether different forms of entry have different impacts,
speciﬁcally entry by domestic ﬁrms or entry through import,
and we explore why the two most likely alternative inter-
pretations—based on knowledge spillovers—are not consis-
tent with the full pattern of our empirical results.
Our analysis relates to several different strands of empir-
ical work. First, there is the empirical literature on the
effects of trade liberalization and inward direct investment
from foreign ﬁrms. Studies including Aitken and Harrison
(1999), Pavcnik (2002), and Javorcik (2004) are, as ours,
based on plant or ﬁrm panel data and exploit variation of
trade or foreign ﬁrm activity across industries and time.2
Aghion et al. (2004), Grifﬁth, Redding, and Simpson
(2002), and Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter (2007) show for
U.K. industries positive correlations of (increases in) the
employment share in foreign ﬁrms and average growth of
total factor productivity in domestic producers. In contrast
to this, we use direct entry measures and focus on investi-
gating systematic variation in incumbent innovation and
productivity reactions to entry with distance to the technol-
ogy frontier. Aghion et al. (2005b, 2006) use state-industry
panel data instead of plant or ﬁrm panel data to investigate
how the effectiveness of the Indian liberalization reform
depends on the technological and institutional state-industry
environment, in particular labor market regulation. Second,
there is the empirical industrial organization literature fol-
lowing the work of Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991) and
Berry (1992). Berry and Reiss (2006) survey structural
econometric models with entry in well-deﬁned, mostly
oligopolistic markets and endogenous market structure and
discuss the insights gained into the determinants of ﬁrms’
entry decisions, the importance of ﬁrm heterogeneity, and
the nature of competition. Olley and Pakes (1996) investi-
gate the effects of deregulation on aggregate productivity
growth and the underlying reallocation mechanism in one
particular industry. Our emphasis is instead on within-ﬁrm
changes in innovation incentives and in variation of entry
effects on incumbent performance across markets. Another
related strand is the literature on product market competi-
tion, ﬁrm performance, and innovation, in particular Nickell
(1996), Blundell, Grifﬁth, and Van Reenen (1999), and
Aghion et al. (2005a). Aghion et al. present evidence on an
inverted-U relationship between product market competi-
tion and innovative activity and ﬁnd this to be steeper in
neck-and-neck industries. Aghion and Grifﬁth (2005) sur-
vey recent theoretical and empirical literature on competi-
tion, entry and growth, and the relevance of distance to
frontier. Aghion and Howitt (2006) focus on policy impli-
cations.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II we
discuss the theoretical background and empirical modeling.
In section III we describe our data. Empirical results are
presented in section IV and section V concludes.
II. Variation of Entry Effects with Distance to Frontier
A. Theoretical Background
Variation of entry effects on incumbent performance,
depending on distance to the technology frontier, follows
from Schumpeterian growth models with escape-entry and
discouragement effects:
● Increasing the threat of frontier entry induces incum-
bents in sectors that are close to the technology frontier
to innovate more in order to escape entry. It reduces
incumbents’ incentives to innovate in sectors that are
further behind the frontier, where there is little hope of
surviving entry.
● Increasing frontier entry threat has a more positive
effect on incumbent productivity growth in sectors that
are closer to the frontier than in sectors further behind
the frontier.
The idea of the escape-entry effect is similar to the idea
of the escape-competition effect as developed in Aghion et
al. (2001). In that model each industry is assumed to be a
2 See also, for example, Amiti and Konings (2005), Bertschek (1995),
and Keller and Yeaple (2007).
FIGURE 1.—REACTIONS TO ENTRY IN INCUMBENTS NEAR AND FAR FROM
THE TECHNOLOGY FRONTIER
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Notes: The ﬁgure plots spline estimates of the relation between the greenﬁeld foreign ﬁrm entry rate
and subsequent total factor productivity growth of domestic incumbent establishments in U.K. four-digit
industries, 1987 to 1993. Each dot represents the productivity growth estimate for establishments in one
industry-year cell. The spline regression includes time and industry ﬁxed effects. Three spline points are
chosen such that all establishment observations in industry-year cells with nonzero entry are grouped into
four equally sized classes. The distance to the technology frontier is a labor productivity index relating
incumbents in four-digit U.K. industries to their U.S. industry equivalent. The top curve (with dots) is for
establishments in industry-year cells near the technology frontier (less or equally distant to the frontier
as the year-speciﬁc median of the distance distribution in the sample). The bottom curve (with triangles)
is for establishments further behind the technology frontier (more distant to the frontier than the sample
median).
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competition is measured by the elasticity of demand be-
tween the rivals’ products. Here we consider a model in
which the rivals are constantly threatened with extinction by
frontier innovators and there is an inﬁnite cross-elasticity of
demand. This leads to the escape-entry effect. Both of these
models assume step-by-step innovation instead of the leap-
frogging assumed in earlier Schumpeterian models. To de-
rive the escape-entry effect what is needed is that the
probability that a frontier incumbent survives frontier entry
is higher than the probability that a lagging incumbent
survives.3 The discouragement effect in lagging industries is
similar to the Schumpeterian appropriability effect of prod-
uct market competition. Systematic variation of innovation
activity with distance to the technology frontier was intro-
duced into Schumpeterian theory by Howitt and Mayer-
Foulkes (2005) and Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti
(2006).
Related theory papers are, in particular, Gilbert and New-
bery (1982) on preemption and Laffont and Tirole (1993) on
the welfare effects of entry regulation in a model of product
differentiation. Laffont and Tirole concentrate on how reg-
ulation affects the size of innovations, or the extent of
differentiation, by entrants and do not allow for incumbent
innovation. Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Tirole (1988)
analyze strategic interaction between entrants and incum-
bents. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) and Aghion et al.
(2005a) focus on competition among incumbent ﬁrms and
its effects on growth, but do not consider entry. Reallocative
effects of globalization and trade liberalization are analyzed
in Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003). We focus instead
on entry effecting growth through within-ﬁrm innovation
effects in incumbents.
B. Empirical Modeling
The descriptive evidence in ﬁgure 1 is clearly not sufﬁ-
cient to establish a causal relationship from entry to inno-
vation and productivity growth or that it depends on dis-
tance to the technology frontier. The central empirical
relationship we are interested in is of the following form:
Y  fP, D, X, (1)
where Y is a measure of incumbent performance, P is entry
threat, D is the distance to frontier, and X is a vector of
further covariates.
We address a number of issues that arise when exploring
this relationship empirically. First, entry threat P is unob-
servable and potentially endogenous in incumbent perfor-
mance equations. We use lagged actual entry to proxy the
unobservable entry threat and, in doing so, we face the same
endogeneity problem as with entry threat, if anything in
aggravated form.4 We discuss the endogeneity of entry
below and outline our identiﬁcation strategy. Second, we
focus on how the effects of frontier entry vary with distance
to the frontier. We measure technologically advanced entry
by considering foreign ﬁrm entry, and to measure distance
to the frontier we use a labor productivity index that relates
incumbents in U.K. industries to their U.S. industry equiv-
alent. In our preferred speciﬁcation the two continuous
measures enter linearly and with an interaction. We also
consider endogeneity of the distance to the frontier, check
whether the distance measure may capture other industry-
speciﬁc inﬂuences, and provide results for other forms of
entry. Third, there are important covariates that may deter-
mine the performance of incumbents in addition to entry—
most important, we think of effects triggered by trade
relations and other factors that affect competition, market
structure, and the rents earned by incumbents. We control
for these using observable and unobservable characteristics
in our main empirical speciﬁcations, and in extended spec-
iﬁcations we allow for endogeneity of our main control
variables. Fourth, to measure incumbent performance we
use two measures of productivity growth, as well as a count
of patents.
To start with we measure incumbent performance as
growth of labor productivity at the establishment level
(LPijt) and specify the following relation:
LPijt    1Ejt1  2Djt1  3Ejt1Djt1 (2)
 X ijt1	  
t  i  uijt,
where i indexes incumbent establishments, j indexes indus-
tries, t indexes years, and E is actual greenﬁeld foreign ﬁrm
entry. To control for different permanent levels of produc-
tivity growth across establishments we include individual
ﬁxed effects i. Common macro shocks are captured by
time dummies 
t. We also use growth of total factor pro-
ductivity, which may account for systematic variation in
factor inputs not captured in labor productivity growth.
Both measures of productivity growth could, however,
also reﬂect advances due to imitation of entrants with
superior technologies rather than innovative activity. Thus,
we also use a count of patents as a measure of incumbent
performance to check more directly whether our results are
picking up changes in ﬁrms’innovative activity. There are a
large number of ﬁrm-year observations with zero patents in
our data, so we estimate a zero-inﬂated Poisson model
3 In section 1 of the Web appendix, we derive the escape-entry effect
from the extreme assumption that a frontier incumbent survives frontier
entry with probability 1, while a lagging incumbent survives with prob-
ability 0. A simpliﬁed version of this model with a ﬁxed entry probability
is sketched in Aghion et al. (2004), Aghion and Grifﬁth (2005), and
Aghion and Howitt (2006). Aghion et al. (2005b) present a closely related
model.
4 In our theoretical context actual entry and entry threat are identical in
industries far behind the frontier, where entrants can never lose against
incumbents. In industries closer to the frontier actual entry and entry threat
differ in situations where entrants may lose, but they will be positively
correlated as long as incumbent innovation aimed at escaping entry is not
too successful in the sense of entry prevention (Web appendix, sections
1.2 and 1.6).
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 22(Greene, 1994; Lambert, 1992). This also relaxes the re-
strictive feature of the Poisson distribution that imposes
equality of the variance and the mean. We model the
probability of being granted at least one patent as a function
of a ﬁrm’s presample stock of patents. Conditional on
having at least one patent, we specify the innovation rate as
nijt  exp  1Ejt1  2Djt1  3Ejt1Djt1 (3)
 X ijt1	  
t  j),
where i indexes incumbent ﬁrms, j indexes industries, t
indexes years, and j indicates industry ﬁxed effects. All
other variables and parameters are deﬁned as above. To take
unobservable ﬁrm-speciﬁc, time-invariant heterogeneity in
patent behavior into account we follow Blundell et al.
(1999) and use presample information on ﬁrms’ patent
stocks.
C. Identiﬁcation and Instruments
The key identiﬁcation issue that we tackle in this paper is
the fact that entry can be endogenous to innovation and
productivity growth. When considering entry into a new
market potential entrants are likely to take into account the
productivity and innovative activity of local incumbents.
We expect a negative covariance between actual entry and
the error term in incumbent performance equations when
industries are close to the frontier, but not necessarily in
industries far from the frontier.5
We use two broad sets of policy reforms for instrument-
ing entry—reforms at the European level and reforms at the
U.K. level that changed entry costs and effected entry
differentially across industries and time.6 In our main model
speciﬁcations we endogenize the linear entry term as well as
its interaction with the distance to frontier. We show results
using different sets of policy instruments: instruments that
capture the EU Single Market Program only, U.K. policy
instruments only, and these instruments pooled.7 The Euro-
pean policy instruments indicate industries in which reforms
undertaken as part of the SMP were ex ante expected to
reduce medium or high entry barriers. The U.K. reforms
include privatization cases—the Thatcher government em-
barked on a large-scale privatization program before similar
programs were implemented in other countries. A substan-
tial portion of government-owned assets were sold and, in
most cases, the privatization decisions resulted in opening
up markets to ﬁrm entry. We use instruments that reﬂect the
respective stock market sales in directly affected industries.
The U.K. reforms also include merger and monopoly cases
where investigations of the U.K. Competition Authority
culminated in policy interventions. For each affected indus-
try we construct a variable that indicates the dates on which
undertakings of inquiries were ﬁrst publicly announced.8
In extended model speciﬁcations we allow for endogene-
ity of the distance to the technology frontier. This is to
address the concern that imposing exogeneity of that vari-
able may affect ﬁndings on the variation of entry effects
with distance to frontier. We augment the set of instruments
with U.S. variables on production inputs that correlate with
the distance to frontier, but should not depend directly on
anticipated developments in U.K. incumbent performance.
The policy interventions that we use for instrumenting
entry may also affect innovation incentives and productivity
growth through other channels, especially through changing
trade relations or the competitive environment. Thus, we
pay attention in our main speciﬁcations to controlling for
trade and competition, and assume that the instruments have
no additional impact on incumbent performance, after con-
ditioning on these covariates. We test the overidentifying
restrictions in these speciﬁcations and experiment with
using subsets of our policy instruments. In addition, we
allow for endogeneity of the trade and competition covariate
by adding U.S. trade and competition variables as instru-
ments, and relying on the additional assumption that the full
set of instruments affects entry, its interaction with the
distance to frontier, and the instrumented covariate differ-
entially.
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics
A. Data
We combine microdata from several sources. Most im-
portant, we use comprehensive establishment-level panel
data for Great Britain from the U.K. Ofﬁce for National
Statistics (ONS) Annual Respondents Database (ARD) for
estimating productivity growth models. It is a legal obliga-
tion for ﬁrms to report these data. Innovation models are
estimated using ﬁrm-level accounting data from Data
Stream that are matched to patent data from the NBER/Case
Western Patent Database for a panel of ﬁrms listed on the
London Stock Exchange (LSE). These ﬁrms account for a
large proportion of U.K. R&D activity.9
Productivity growth: Our key performance indicator is
productivity growth, which we measure using the disaggre-
gated ARD panel data on establishment inputs and outputs.
5 In line with our theory framework foreign ﬁrms are more likely to enter
industries that are close to frontier if their relative advantages are high and
they anticipate this correctly.
6 Controlling for unobservable individual, time-invariant heterogeneity
and for time effects, as we also do, is unlikely to be sufﬁcient to address
entry endogeneity, since industry-speciﬁc, time-varying changes of in-
cumbent performance should affect entry. Even lagging entry measures
will not fully solve the problem if entrants anticipate changes to the
distribution of U.K. incumbent performance and this leads to relative
changes in entry across industries.
7 We apply IV estimation techniques in linear models, and a control
function approach in nonlinear patent count models. In linear models,
control function and IV coefﬁcient estimates coincide. See Wooldridge
(2002) or Blundell and Powell (2003).
8 See section 2.2 and table A.4, both in the Web appendix, for further
details.
9 Section 2 in the Web appendix provides further details on the data and
the construction of variables.
THE EFFECTS OF ENTRY ON INCUMBENT INNOVATION AND PRODUCTIVITY 23We calculate growth of labor productivity (LP) as growth in
real output per employee. To determine growth in total
factor productivity (TFP) we implement a superlative index
number approach, smoothing observed factor shares in
order to mitigate potential consequences of measurement
error. We check that our empirical results are robust to not
smoothing factor shares and to not imposing perfect com-
petition.10
Innovation: We measure innovation using the count of
patents ﬁrms take out in the U.S. Patent Ofﬁce. Focusing on
U.S. patents of U.K. ﬁrms to measure innovation is advan-
tageous in our context, since U.K. ﬁrms are unlikely to
patent low-value inventions in the United States.
Entry: Our focus in this paper is on technologically
advanced entry, which we measure by greenﬁeld entry of
foreign ﬁrms. This captures entry from ﬁrms that set up new
production facilities in Great Britain, and which operate
internationally and are thus most likely to produce at the
technological frontier.11 Using panel data at the plant level
from the ARD we calculate the annual greenﬁeld foreign
ﬁrm entry rate as the share of industry employment in
entrants that meet the following conditions: the entering
ﬁrm (i) starts producing in one or more new British produc-
tion sites in the year considered, (ii) is foreign owned, and
(iii) did not already operate beforehand in the respective
industry in Great Britain.
Our measure has several advantages over other foreign
entry measures that are commonly used. In contrast to
counting the number of foreign entrants, it takes the size of
entrants into account. Compared with ﬁnancial ﬂows of
inward direct investment the pattern of new real production
activity in foreign ﬁrms is directly reﬂected. In contrast to
our earlier work (Aghion et al., 2004) and related literature,
which use industry-level measures of employment in for-
eign ﬁrms or equity owned by foreign investors,12 we focus
on greenﬁeld entry. This has the advantage of reﬂecting the
scale of entry, but not reallocation between domestic and
foreign owners via acquisition, takeover, or merger activi-
ties.
Greenﬁeld entry of domestic ﬁrms is calculated in a
similar way and used below to proxy entry further behind
the frontier. The value range for our entry measures is 0
to 100.
Distance to the technology frontier: We capture the
distance of incumbents in each U.K. industry to its U.S.
industry equivalent using a three-year moving average of
U.S. industry labor productivity relative to labor productiv-
ity in the respective incumbent U.K. industry. We average
over the current and the two preceding years. We use U.S.
industries because they most often represent the world
technological frontier, or are at least ahead of the United
Kingdom.13 Thus, U.S. industries can trigger technologi-
cally advanced entry into the United Kingdom, and a large
share of foreign entrants in Britain are indeed U.S.-owned.14
The distance calculation uses U.S. industry panel data from
the NBER manufacturing productivity database and U.K.
data from the ARD. In addition to using a moving average,
we also try alternative measures with other technology
metrics and we use discrete versions of the variables to
address concerns about measurement error.
Other variables: To measure trade activity we use the
ratio of industry import over output from OECD STAN
panel data. To capture the variation of competitive condi-
tions across industries and time we calculate an index of
average proﬁtability in incumbent establishments based on
ARD panel data. The index varies between 0 and 1 and
takes the value of 1 in case of perfect competition. Pre-
sample information on patenting activity is summarized
using a continuous patent stock variable based on patents
dating back to 1968 along with a simple indicator of
presample patent activity for ﬁrms in the panel of LSE-
listed ﬁrms.
B. Descriptive Statistics
To estimate productivity growth models we use an un-
balanced panel of 25,388 observations on 5,161 domestic
incumbent establishments in 180 four-digit industries
(based on U.K. SIC 80) over the period 1987 to 1993.15 Of
these, 81% are older than ten years when entering the
sample. They have on average 263 employees between 1987
and 1993 and real output of £9m in 1980 pounds. Growth of
LP is on average 0.9% and TFP growth is 1.1%. This
reﬂects the recession in the early 1990s; the corresponding
ﬁgures for the years 1987 and 1990 are 2.3% and 1.0%,
respectively.
Innovation models are estimated using an unbalanced
panel of 1,073 observations on 174 incumbent ﬁrms in 60
three-digit industries between 1987 and 1993. Seventy-four
percent of these ﬁrms were listed on the LSE for more than
a decade at sample entry. On average, they employ 8,286
people during the period 1987 to 1993 and have real sales of
£433m in 1980 pounds. About 60% take out at least one
patent at the U.S. Patent Ofﬁce. As typically found, the
sample distribution of patent counts is highly skewed—
many ﬁrms do not patent, some patent a little, and a small
number of ﬁrms are granted many patents per year.
10 See table A.7 in the Web appendix.
11 Multinational ﬁrms have been shown to be more productive on
average than ﬁrms that operate only nationally. For the United Kingdom
see Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2007), Criscuolo and Martin (2005),
and Grifﬁth and Simpson (2004), among others.
12 See, among others, Aitken and Harrison (1999), Grifﬁth et al. (2002),
Haskel et al. (2007), and Javorcik (2004).
13 See, inter alia, Grifﬁth, Redding, and Van Reenen (2004).
14 For the time period 1986 to 1992 theARD data show that, on average,
36% of all greenﬁeld foreign entrants in British manufacturing industries
are under U.S. ownership.
15 As we would expect in line with the theory framework we ﬁnd that our
main results are stronger when we restrict the sample to incumbents that
are more likely to be industry leaders than they are in the complementing
subsamples (Web appendix, table A.7).
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 24Given our interest in studying how entry effects vary with
distance to the industry-speciﬁc technology frontier, an
important prerequisite for our empirical analysis is substan-
tial variation in the sample distance distribution. Thus, note
that about 20% of all four-digit industry-years in our data
are at or close to the frontier (less than 3.5% behind their
U.S. industry equivalent), while another 20% are at least
50% behind. It is also crucial that we have variation in entry
rates at different distances to the frontier: there are four-digit
industry-years with no, some, or substantial greenﬁeld for-
eign ﬁrm entry in each quartile of the distance distribution.
In addition, comparing quartile-speciﬁc distributions we see
considerable overlap of these for the entry rate, the number
of employees in entering ﬁrms, and entrants’ size.16
IV. Empirical Results
To investigate the economic mechanism behind the de-
scriptive evidence in ﬁgure 1 we analyze how the effects of
frontier entry on incumbent innovation and productivity
vary with the distance to the technology frontier, allowing
for endogeneity of entry and controlling for possible con-
founding factors. We address a number of potential robust-
ness concerns, take other forms of entry into account, and
conclude by explaining why the most likely alternative
interpretations do not fully explain our empirical ﬁndings.
A. Entry
The key identiﬁcation issue that we address in our empirical
analysis is the potential endogeneity of entry to productivity
growth and patenting. We instrument greenﬁeld foreign ﬁrm
entry using major EU and U.K. policy reforms that aimed at
changing entry costs during the 1980s and early 1990s. In table
1 we ﬁrst show how the separate types of policy reforms relate
to entry (columns 1–4), then we present our main ﬁrst-stage
regressions for entry and the interaction of entry and distance
to the technology frontier (columns 5–10). These are used in
the second-stage estimations in table 2 and include all exoge-
nous variables from the second-stage equations.
In column 1 of table 1 we relate the EU-wide Single
Market Program (SMP) to greenﬁeld foreign ﬁrm entry, and
constrain the EU-SMP coefﬁcient to be common across all
affected industries. The positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient
indicates that the EU-SMP led to increased entry—a result
that is consistent with ex ante expectations. In column 2 we
use information on industries that are directly affected by
the U.K. privatization program, again constraining the co-
efﬁcient to be the same across industries, and ﬁnd a positive
and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient, just as we do in column 3
considering all U.K. merger cases where investigations of
the U.K. CompetitionAuthority triggered subsequent policy
interventions. In column 4 with U.K. monopoly cases that
16 TablesA.2 andA.3 in the Web appendix provide more details on these
issues; descriptive statistics on the estimation samples are in table A.1.
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THE EFFECTS OF ENTRY ON INCUMBENT INNOVATION AND PRODUCTIVITY 25triggered policy interventions the coefﬁcient is negative and
signiﬁcant. However, if we allow the effect to vary in one
industry (printing and publishing) by adding an industry-
speciﬁc reform variable to the vector of explanatory vari-
ables then we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient of
0.041 (standard error: 0.024) for the term that aggregates
over all U.K. monopoly cases. In fact, when we look across
all policy reforms we ﬁnd that their impact on entry (and on
the entry-distance interaction) is very pronounced in some
additional industries.
In the ﬁrst-stage regressions in columns 5 and 6 we
include a common EU-SMPeffect across affected industries
and allow for four additional industry-speciﬁc effects.17 In
columns 7 and 8 we use the U.K.-based policy reforms and
allow the effects to vary in one industry affected by privat-
ization and three industries with merger and monopoly
investigations.18 In columns 9 and 10 we include all of these
instruments. For all ﬁrst-stage regressions we report F-tests
on the joint signiﬁcance of the instruments excluded from
the second-stage equations. Overall, the empirical evidence
suggests that the set of EU-wide and U.K.-based policy
reforms, which liberalized product markets and affected
entry costs, have led to more greenﬁeld foreign ﬁrm entry in
the United Kingdom.
B. Growth of Productivity
We start by considering the average effect of entry on
subsequent productivity growth in incumbents, and then
focus on how entry effects vary with the distance to the
technology frontier. All regressions in table 2 include year
dummies and establishment effects. Standard errors allow
for correlation between establishments within the same
industry, and observations are weighted by employment and
the inverse of their sampling probability.19
In columns 1 to 5 in table 2 we explain labor productivity
(LP) growth in incumbents. In column 1 we show OLS
estimates using the lagged levels of foreign entry, distance
to frontier, import penetration, and competition as explan-
atory variables. We see a positive and signiﬁcant correlation
of greenﬁeld foreign ﬁrm entry with subsequent LP growth
in domestic incumbent establishments.20 High values of the
lagged distance measure indicate incumbent establishments
in U.K. industries in years where they are far from their
17 We include industry-speciﬁc reform variables for the following
SIC-80 industries: 248 (refractory and ceramics), 361 (shipbuilding and
repairing), 371 (precision instruments), and 432/438 (cotton and silk,
carpets and other textile ﬂoor coverings).
18 These SIC-80 industries are 2565 (explosive chemical products), 3204
(fabricated constructional steel work), 361 (shipbuilding and repairing),
and 475 (printing and publishing).
19 We ﬁnd similar results if we estimate model speciﬁcations using
unweighted data, four-digit industry instead of establishment effects, and
standard errors that allow for correlation between establishments within
the same industry-year. See table A.9 in the Web appendix.
20 This is in line with related ﬁndings in Aghion et al. (2004), Grifﬁth et
al. (2002), and Haskel et al. (2007). The theory framework discussed
above yields this prediction for plausible parameter assumptions (Web
appendix, section 1.8).
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 26industry-speciﬁc U.S. technology frontier. The positive and
signiﬁcant coefﬁcient suggests higher LP growth rates for
incumbents in industries far from the frontier. Another form
of entry we control for is entry into local product markets
through imports. We use a lagged measure of import pene-
tration and ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant effect on subse-
quent LP growth in incumbents. To capture the variation of
competitive conditions across industries and time, we in-
clude a lagged measure of average proﬁtability in incum-
bents’ industries. In line with previous work (such as Nick-
ell, 1996), we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient.21
Since our focus in this paper is on the variation of entry
effects with the distance to the technology frontier, we now
turn to more ﬂexible empirical models where we interact
foreign entry and distance to frontier (see equation [2] in
section IIB). The OLS estimates in column 2 show a
negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on the interaction term,
while the coefﬁcients on the linear entry and distance terms
remain positive and signiﬁcant. The negative interaction
effect counteracts the positive effect of entry in industries
that are far away from the frontier.22 Thus, the OLS results
suggest that incumbent productivity growth responds more
positively to technologically advanced entry in industries
close to the technology frontier than in industries farther
below the frontier.
In columns 3 to 5 we address the issue of entry endoge-
neity in the linear and in the interacted entry terms. We use
alternative identiﬁcation strategies with different sets of
policy instruments as shown in table 1 and discussed above.
In column 3 we use the set of EU-SMPpolicy instruments—
the corresponding ﬁrst-stage regressions are shown in col-
umns 5 and 6 of table 1. In column 4 of table 2 we use the
set of U.K. policy instruments, and in column 5 the full set
of EU and U.K. policy reforms. The exclusion restrictions in
these models are not rejected—the 2 test results are re-
ported near the bottom of table 2. All three IV regressions
show negative and signiﬁcant interaction effects, and posi-
tive and signiﬁcant linear effects and, thus, conﬁrm the main
conclusion from the OLS evidence.23 Instrumenting is
found to be important.24 We ﬁnd evidence for negative
covariance between actual foreign entry and the error term
in our productivity growth models in industries close to the
frontier. This is in line with our expectation derived from
theory. However, our ﬁndings are also consistent with at-
tenuation bias towards 0 in OLS regressions, caused by
measurement error.
So far we have focused on results for model speciﬁca-
tions with growth in LP as the dependent variable. One
concern with this might be that our results are affected by
unaccounted for systematic variation in factor usage. In
columns 6 to 10 of table 2 we reestimate using growth in
total factor productivity (TFP) as dependent variable. The
results and conclusions hold up, and the precision of the
estimates tends to increase.
To investigate the economic signiﬁcance of our estimates
we calculate the growth impact of increasing entry by one
sample standard deviation (0.5 percentage points) at the
10%, 50%, and 90% percentile of the sample distribution of
the distance to the frontier, using the estimated coefﬁcients
from column 5. In industries at median distance, increasing
greenﬁeld foreign ﬁrm entry by one standard deviation
raises subsequent LP growth in domestic incumbent estab-
lishments by 0.7 percentage points. In industries far from
the frontier (90% percentile), the growth effect is 0.6
percentage points, and close to the frontier (10% percentile)
it is 2 percentage points. Since the sample mean of incum-
bent growth in LPis 1.1% and the standard deviation is 13.8
percentage points, these estimates are economically signif-
icant and their variation along the distance distribution
seems reasonable.25
All in all, the above OLS and IV estimates strongly
indicate heterogeneity in the effects of greenﬁeld foreign
ﬁrm entry on subsequent LP and TFP growth of domestic
incumbent establishments as predicted from theory: techno-
logically advanced entry in industries close to the technol-
ogy frontier triggers subsequent productivity growth among
incumbents and can discourage it in industries that are far
from the frontier.
C. Patenting
The evidence on productivity growth provides support for
the idea that frontier entry spurs incumbents to invest in
innovation, particularly when they are near the technology
frontier. A lingering concern is, however, that productivity
growth may reﬂect not only entry-induced innovative activ-
ity, but also entrant imitation or growth driven by realloca-
21 The results in this paragraph all hold as well in models where we
include each of the four explanatory variables separately. We checked that
the coefﬁcient of the entry rate is driven by changes in the numerator, the
number of new employees in entering foreign ﬁrms, rather than by
changes in the denominator. See table A.6 in the Web appendix.
22 We ﬁnd this pattern conﬁrmed when we use a discretized model
speciﬁcation involving a different technology metric for measuring the
distance to frontier (Web appendix, table A.7).
23 Further variation of the set of policy instruments has also been
investigated. When we restrict the set of instruments to either instruments
capturing U.K. privatization cases only or U.K. merger and monopoly
investigations only, we get qualitatively similar, but noisier second-stage
results than those reported in table 2. However, in all these LP or TFP
growth regressions the entry terms remain jointly signiﬁcant at the 1%
signiﬁcance level. This is also the case if we restrict the instrument set to
four variables that aggregate, respectively, EU-SMP industries, U.K.
privatization cases, U.K. merger cases, and U.K. monopoly cases. In
addition, both entry terms are then also individually signiﬁcant in the TFP
growth regression. See table A.8 in the Web appendix for further details.
24 We can reject the null hypothesis of exogenous entry terms using
F-tests on the control function: the F-test statistic for the LPmodel in table
2, column 5, is 3.07 with two degrees of freedom, and the one for the TFP
model in table 2, column 10, is 7.92.
25 Using the estimated coefﬁcients from column 10 with total factor
productivity gives more pronounced, but qualitatively similar, economic
effects.
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address this issue we explore the relation between entry and
innovation more directly in patent count models. While we
use a different data set, we ﬁnd a strikingly similar pattern
of entry effects as for productivity growth.
In table 3 we present estimates from a zero-inﬂated
Poisson model.26 For comparison we also show results for a
linear model in column 9 of table 4 and for a generalized
negative binomial model in column 10. All speciﬁcations in
table 3 include year effects, dummies for (grouped) three-
digit industries, and ﬁrm-speciﬁc presample patent stock
variables to capture unobservable ﬁrm-speciﬁc, time-
invariant heterogeneity of patenting behavior (see Blundell
et al., 1999). We show sandwiched estimates of the standard
errors, which allow for correlation between ﬁrms within the
same industry-year. The probability of being granted zero
patents is modeled as a function of a ﬁrm’s presample stock
of patents.27
In column 1 greenﬁeld foreign ﬁrm entry and distance to
the frontier enter in levels, while import penetration and
competition enter as quadratic functions. Entry is positively
correlated with the patenting activity of U.K. incumbent
ﬁrms, as is distance to the technological frontier. For import
penetration, the effects are increasing until above the 90%
percentile of the sample distribution and positive for the
whole distribution. We ﬁnd an inverted-U relationship be-
tween competition and patent counts, in line with Aghion et
al. (2005a).
In column 2 we include the interaction between foreign
entry and distance to the frontier, and ﬁnd this is negatively
correlated with patenting in correspondence to our produc-
tivity growth results. In columns 3, 4, and 5 we allow for
endogeneity of the linear and interaction terms by using the
residuals from the ﬁrst-stage regressions for entry and
entry-distance interaction as control function corrections.
As in table 2, we ﬁrst show results using EU-SMP instru-
ments only, then instruments reﬂecting the U.K. policy
reforms only, and then using all these instruments together.
The pattern of estimates holds across all three instrumenting
strategies. Taken together, the patent count results suggest
that a major driving force behind the entry effects in our
26 The ﬁrm panel that we use in this section provides industry informa-
tion on the three-digit industry level only, whereas all estimations dis-
cussed so far involve using information on the four-digit industry level.
27 When testing the inclusion of additional variables into the inﬂation
equation, especially measures of entry, distance to frontier, trade, or
competition, these turned out to be irrelevant.
TABLE 3.—PATENT COUNTS:Z ERO-INFLATED POISSON ESTIMATES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ZIP ZIP ZIP-CF ZIP-CF ZIP-CF
Dependent variable Number of patentsijt
Foreign entryjt1  distancejt1(EF  D) 0.557 1.933 3.238 1.665
(0.237) (0.679) (1.618) (0.583)
Foreign entryjt1(EF) 0.107 0.245 0.608 0.437 0.506
(0.059) (0.078) (0.227) (0.216) (0.171)
Distance to frontierjt1(D) 0.582 0.652 0.852 0.753 0.825
(0.250) (0.251) (0.300) (0.254) (0.277)
Import penetrationjt1 1.746 1.692 1.937 1.957 1.834
(0.817) (0.770) (0.794) (0.759) (0.771)
Import penetrationjt1 squared 0.567 0.542 0.616 0.605 0.600
(0.309) (0.287) (0.297) (0.287) (0.291)
Competitionjt1 31.876 33.950 32.003 28.790 32.231
(16.764) (16.641) (17.200) (16.308) (17.054)
Competitionjt1 squared 17.722 18.885 17.910 15.733 18.007
(9.413) (9.340) (9.667) (9.240) (9.617)
Patent stocki, presample 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
D (patent stocki, presample > 0) 1.490 1.502 1.515 1.503 1.515
(0.317) (0.318) (0.319) (0.316) (0.317)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inﬂation Equation
Patent stocki, presample 0.207 0.207 0.207 0.207 0.207
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036)
D (patent stocki, presample > 0) 0.558 0.554 0.550 0.553 0.552
(0.175) (0.175) (0.175) (0.175) (0.175)
Control function EF, EF  D EF, EF  D EF, EF  D
Type of instruments SMP MM, P SMP, MM, P
Number of observations 1,073 1,073 1,073 1,073 1,073
Notes: The table displays zero-inﬂated Poisson estimates (ZIP) of patent count models; in columns 3 to 5 we allow for entry endogeneity in the linear and interacted entry term by including the respective ﬁrst-stage
residuals as control function terms. Estimates are for the sample of 1,073 observations on 174 incumbent ﬁrms listed at the London Stock Exchange between 1987 and 1993. Bold numbers indicate coefﬁcients.
Standard errors in parentheses and italics are robust and allow for correlation between ﬁrms within the same industry-year. SMP indicates policy instruments capturing the EU Single Market Program, MM indicates
policy instruments based on U.K. Competition Authority merger and monopoly cases, and P indicates U.K. privatization instruments.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 28productivity growth estimations is incumbent innovation,
not just imitation or reallocation.
D. Extensions and Further Robustness Checks
Greenﬁeld domestic ﬁrm entry and entry through imports.
In our empirical analysis we focused so far on foreign ﬁrm
entry, which is from ﬁrms that operate internationally, and
are more likely to produce at the technological frontier than
other entrants in the United Kingdom. This accords well
with introducing entry threat at the new technological fron-
tier into the framework of Aghion et al. (2001).
In that theoretical context, we can also explore the case
where entry takes place behind the new frontier. If entry
takes place one step behind the new frontier, then increasing
entry threat encourages innovation and productivity growth
in sectors that are at intermediate distance from the frontier;
it discourages innovation and productivity growth in sectors
that are far below the frontier; and it has little effect close to
the frontier. In the case where entrants threaten to enter two
or more steps behind the new frontier, no incumbent reac-
tions are to be expected.28
In table 4 we show that greenﬁeld domestic ﬁrm entry has
no impact on incumbent LP growth (column 1) or patenting
(column 5). The linear effects are insigniﬁcant, as are the
interactions with the distance to frontier.29 These results
correspond with the predictions above, since greenﬁeld
domestic entry rates are likely to reﬂect entry behind the
frontier. Typical ﬁndings in the literature are that the aver-
age domestic entrant struggles for survival during the ﬁrst
years after market entry, is occupied with learning about its
own productivity and market conditions, and is very small
compared with foreign entrants or incumbents in the same
industry. The number of innovative domestic entrants is
usually small, they are often found to be hampered by
ﬁnancial constraints or immature technologies and, thus,
even innovative domestic entrants are unlikely to challenge
incumbents shortly after their market entry.30
Entry through imports is another form of entry into
product markets, and industry-level import penetration rates
into the United Kingdom partly reﬂect entry of new prod-
ucts. Among these may be technologically advanced prod-
ucts, but also less advanced products. Our import penetra-
tion variable is, thus, a much noisier measure of frontier
entry than greenﬁeld foreign ﬁrm entry. In accordance with
this we ﬁnd similar, but weaker, effects for import penetra-
tion than for greenﬁeld foreign ﬁrm entry. As already
reported, linear (and quadratic) speciﬁcations for import
penetration indicate positive and signiﬁcant level effects.
The coefﬁcients of the interactions with the distance to
frontier in our performance regressions are negative and
signiﬁcant in the LPgrowth and the patent count regressions
(table 4, columns 2 and 6).31 In all these regressions our
main ﬁndings for the linear and interacted terms of green-
ﬁeld foreign ﬁrm entry remain very stable.32
Endogeneity of distance to frontier, competition, and
import penetration. We augment our main model speciﬁ-
cations from table 2, column 5, and table 3, column 5, to
allow for endogeneity of the distance to the technology
frontier. We add the industry-level U.S. capital-labor ratio
and the industry-level U.S. ratio of skilled over all workers
to the set of instruments. These are signiﬁcantly correlated
with the distance measure and we assume that they do not
depend directly on anticipated shocks to incumbent perfor-
mance in the United Kingdom. We estimate three ﬁrst-stage
regressions: one for entry, one for the distance, and one for
their interaction. The ﬁndings for LP growth and patenting
in table 4, columns 3 and 7, show that our second-stage
entry, distance, and interaction results remain robust.33
In addition, we test the robustness of our ﬁndings to
allowing for endogeneity of import penetration or competi-
tion. When treating import penetration as potentially endog-
enous in the LP growth model we use the industry-level
U.S. import penetration as an additional instrument and
estimate three ﬁrst-stage regressions: one for entry, one for
the entry-distance interaction, and one for import penetra-
tion.34 The second-stage results in table 4, column 4, pro-
vide support for a positive level effect of import penetration
on labor productivity growth and, most important, for het-
erogeneous effects of greenﬁeld foreign ﬁrm entry along the
distance to the frontier distribution. These ﬁndings are
conﬁrmed in the corresponding patenting and TFP growth
regressions.35 To address potential endogeneity of our com-
petition covariate, we add an industry-level index of U.S.
proﬁtability to the set of instruments, estimate the extended
set of ﬁrst-stage equations, and ﬁnd our main results in LP
growth, TFP growth, and patent count regressions again
conﬁrmed.36
28 In this case actual entry would not occur since entry is optimal only
when the entrant can take away market shares from the incumbent.
29 The corresponding TFP growth regression conﬁrms (Web appendix,
table A.9).
30 See, for example, Caves (1998), Disney, Haskel, and Heden (2003),
Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988), Geroski (1995), and Gompers and
Lerner (1999). In our data the average plant size of domestic entrants is
about ten times smaller than that of foreign entrants in their industry and
about seven times smaller than that of incumbent plants in their industry
that are at least ﬁve years old.
31 In the TFP growth regression we ﬁnd a positive and insigniﬁcant
coefﬁcient for the import-distance interaction (Web appendix, table A.9).
32 If we interact competition with the distance to frontier, these interac-
tions remain insigniﬁcant in the LP growth, TFP growth, and patent count
regressions. The estimates for the linear distance terms get noisy, but the
coefﬁcients for the entry terms and the entry-distance interactions remain
stable and signiﬁcant at the 1% or 5% signiﬁcance level (Web appendix,
table A.10).
33 Results are similar if we use TFP growth as dependent variable (Web
appendix, table A.9); ﬁrst-stage results are in table A.5 in the Web
appendix.
34 See table A.5 in the Web appendix for ﬁrst-stage results.
35 See table 4, column 8 and table A.9 in the Web appendix.
36 See table A.10 in the Web appendix.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 30Alternative omitted effects and knowledge spillovers as
explanations. We investigate the possibility that the inter-
action between the distance to the technology frontier and
foreign entry may simply reﬂect alternative omitted inter-
action effects. We expand the covariate vectors of our main
model speciﬁcations with additional industry characteristics
that might affect incumbents’ abilities and incentives to
react to entry. When adding, for example, a lagged industry-
level measure of average establishment size and its interac-
tion with entry to the labor productivity growth model we
ﬁnd similar effects for the linear entry term, the linear
distance term, and their interaction as before.37 Using in-
stead the industry employment share in establishments with
working owners to capture the variation of ownership struc-
tures across industries and time, or using an industry-level
measure of capital per worker, does not lead to any insta-
bility of our main ﬁndings.
Finally, we consider the extent to which alternative the-
oretical explanations may also be consistent with the pattern
of empirical results reported above. Potential candidates are
theories that focus on the role of knowledge spillovers
instead of innovation incentives. Consider the widely estab-
lished idea that ﬁrms and sectors further from the technol-
ogy frontier should beneﬁt most from knowledge spillovers,
since the scope for learning is highest there.38 This suggests
positive coefﬁcients on the linear distance to frontier terms,
as well as on their interactions with entry. We ﬁnd, however,
a different pattern, namely negative interaction effects and
positive level effects of the distance to frontier.39
Another idea prevalent in the existing literature on
knowledge spillovers argues that ﬁrms in industries closer
to the technology frontier have higher absorptive capacity
and may beneﬁt more from spillovers. If so, then ﬁrms in
industries closer to the frontier should react stronger to
general spillovers, as well as to knowledge transfers from
entrants, than ﬁrms in industries further behind the frontier.
Our ﬁnding of negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcients on the
interaction terms is consistent with this. But the positive and
signiﬁcant coefﬁcients for the linear distance to frontier
terms are not in line with this explanation.
V. Conclusions
In this paper we provide comprehensive empirical evi-
dence on substantial heterogeneity of productivity growth
and patenting reactions in incumbent ﬁrms to foreign ﬁrm
entry. This corresponds to Schumpeterian growth theory
suggesting systematic variation of incumbent innovation
incentives with the distance to the technology frontier.
Threat of technologically advanced entry encourages in-
cumbent innovation and productivity growth in sectors that
are initially close to the technological frontier, whereas it
may discourage incumbents in sectors further behind the
frontier. We use rich micro panel data and address the
problem of endogeneity in foreign entry by exploiting
variation in entry conditions that arises due to major Euro-
pean or U.K. policy interventions. Endogeneity of distance
to frontier, competition, and trade are also considered, and
results for domestic ﬁrm entry and entry through import
complement our analysis of foreign ﬁrm entry.
Our ﬁndings have implications for the policy debate on
market (de)regulation, competition policy, privatization, and
trade liberalization. This debate underlies the consideration
of costs and beneﬁts of globalization and the discussion on
entry regulation in different countries and industries (Ace-
moglu et al., 2006; Bertrand & Kramarz, 2002; Djankov et
al., 2002; Nicoletti & Scarpetta, 2003). Policies aiming at
decreasing or removing product market barriers to entry
alone may not be sufﬁcient to foster growth of incumbent
ﬁrms in all sectors of an economy, even if such policies are
found to be growth-enhancing on average. This, in turn,
suggests the need for complementary labor and capital
market institutions that facilitate the reallocation of factors
and resources from less to more technologically developed
sectors where incumbent ﬁrms respond more positively to
higher entry threat.
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